Rogers Panel Finds Success by Keeping Focus Narrow

Presidents appoint commissions for many reasons: to stimulate thinking and debate on emerging issues, to create a consensus behind some important initiatives or to appear to be doing something about a problem that demands attention even if it cannot be solved.

The Reagan Administration has also turned to commissions for yet another purpose: to broker a political compromise when the normal machinery of government grinds to a halt. Both the Greenspan Social Security and the Scowcroft MX missile commissions come to mind as examples of this approach.

The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident--popularly known by the name of its chairman, former Secretary of State William P. Rogers--is a traditional commission of another type. Established just over four months ago, the commission has conducted a nonpartisan inquiry into the causes of an unforgetable disaster. It has served a cathartic, therapeutic function after a national trauma. Perhaps most important, the commission offers an opportunity to reform a space program and an agency whose credibility has been shaken.

The Rogers Commission is akin to the Warren Commission, established in 1963 by President Lyndon B. Johnson to reassure the nation after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It resembles even more the Long Commission, established by President Reagan after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon to determine what went wrong and to suggest ways of avoiding such debacles in the future.

How then has the Rogers Commission performed? Extremely well. It has accomplished much while avoiding a number of common pitfalls. The commission resisted the temptation to produce a scapegoat. It was correct to emphasize a failure system, not simply the poor judgment of certain individuals. The commission has also successfully trod that delicate balance between appearing as a kangaroo court, out to get those responsible, and as a whitewash, determined to avoid embarrassment to the Administration that appointed it. Visible demonstrations of dissent were kept in check--no mean accomplishment, given the degree of controversy. Public confidence was also strengthened by the decision to keep secrecy at a minimum and to conduct open hearings whenever possible.

Other common pitfalls were also avoided. The commissioners did much of the work themselves and acted with dispatch. Most important, the shuttle commission kept its purview narrow. Rogers might have sought to remake the space program or the space agency; instead, he mostly kept the focus of his work on why the Challenger tragedy happened and what can be done to avoid future ones.

Some have criticized Rogers for sidestepping such questions as the composition of future crews and the proper time that should elapse between shuttle launches. The commission’s report also resists offering specific opinions on the future role of men and women in the space program, the space station or how dependent the United States ought to remain on the shuttle for exploring space and launching satellites, pointing out only that “reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future.” These are questions for a larger debate and, possibly, another commission.

By remaining modest, Rogers avoided the tendency of commissions to become too ambitious. Those that try to do too much often end up accomplishing little. Rogers wisely decided not to get into the business of micromanaging the shuttle’s future, much less the space program. Instead, the commission concentrated on what it could address in a short time: explaining why the Challenger tragedy happened. It concluded with surprising confidence that the booster seals were the immediate cause of the tragedy while pointing out other technical problems that require fixing. But the report recognized that a technical response alone would be inadequate. The real problem in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration had become a mixture of complacency and a loss of devotion to detail and quality control. Such behavior is common to large businesses and organizations, especially after their initial innovative phase has given way to a more bureaucratic one. NASA’s corporate culture was ascendant; the commission was right to focus on it.

What is necessary now is for someone to champion the commission’s findings and recommendations. Congress will surely be interested, as will the media. But the key will be NASA itself. Reform imposed from the outside on a reluctant organization is never as effective as reform embraced from the inside by management and workers. The Rogers Commission will have succeeded, and the country will have benefited, if the object of its criticism accepts its recommendations and carries them.