Dilemmas of the New Iraq

Increased fighting in Iraq again poses fundamental questions for the U.S. military and the Iraqi interim government on how to deal with rebels. U.S. commanders talk of “finishing the fight” against the insurgents. It would be good if that rhetoric scared the gunmen into surrender, but if not, it’s time to try negotiations again. One measure being hinted at, a U.S. assault on the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, would be a catastrophe.

The interim government of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi faces challenges both from Sunni Muslims who supported Saddam Hussein and from Shiite Muslims whom Hussein persecuted. The current unrest is spearheaded by Muqtada Sadr, the 30-ish son of an especially respected Shiite cleric who was slain by Hussein in 1999. Sadr heads the Al Mahdi militia, made up of hundreds, if not thousands, of young, poor slum dwellers happy to have a cause like attacking U.S. troops and any Iraqi they can label a U.S. puppet -- such as Allawi. Disputes over how tough to be with the rebels are causing a split in the Allawi government, which took political control of the country June 28 but still relies on U.S. troops to keep it in power.

Sadr’s militia controls much of the Sadr City slum in Baghdad and is battling British forces in Basra in the south, besides fighting U.S. and Iraqi forces in Najaf. The cleric’s ultimate goal is unclear. He has said he will not discuss Iraq’s political future until U.S. troops leave the country; he has urged his followers to fight on “even if you see me as a prisoner or a martyr.” But many of his followers have been killed in the recent fighting, which ended a cease-fire reached between U.S. troops and Sadr’s fighters in the spring.

It is especially troubling that Sadr has gained support from some Iraqi officials. The deputy governor of Basra province doubles as the cleric’s representative and claims that governors of three southern provinces want autonomy from the central government. Shiites account for more than half of Iraq’s population, with a large concentration in the south. But more autonomy for the south would encourage Kurds in the north to seek greater freedom from central rule, possibly leading to an all-out civil war with U.S. troops stuck in the middle.

The Iraqi national guard’s refusal to stand and fight during the spring siege of Fallouja and complaints about its performance since are evidence that it is not ready to take on the Mahdi militia even if a unified Allawi government were to order it to do so.

Destruction of the shrine could unleash violent public rage. But if U.S. forces can lead the national guard and Iraqi police in pacifying Najaf outside the area around the Imam Ali shrine (and its currently misnamed Valley of Peace cemetery), they may be able to isolate Sadr’s followers, cut off their supplies and force their eventual surrender. Failing that, Allawi will have to, from a position of weakness, somehow persuade his fellow (but far more radical) Shiites to lay down arms and seek a peaceful role in politics. The only carrot may be immunity from prosecution.