A Plan for Prevention or Provocation?

Question: What does a murderous tyrant who has proved time and again that he cares not a whit for human life do when he knows he’s done for? Answer: Go out in a blaze of glory, inflicting as much harm as possible on his enemies.

The Bush administration is right to worry that such apocalyptic logic might appeal to Saddam Hussein if the U.S. invades Iraq. After all, Hussein is not just coldblooded; he’s a megalomaniac who just might conclude that a fiery end would immortalize him in Arab minds.

To guard against such contingencies, the White House has codified the administration’s post-Sept. 11 reassessment of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. At the core of the new approach is a dire warning: The United States will “resort to all our options� against those who use such weapons against us or our friends. It’s pretty clear whom the message is intended for.

There’s one problem, though: This strategy makes no sense given the (accurate) portrait the White House and the Pentagon have painted of Hussein.

The administration’s case for war against Iraq is that Hussein cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear, chemical or biological weapons because the laws of deterrence don’t apply to him. He’s too ruthless and unpredictable; threatening him with retaliation if he uses such weapons would be useless.

But if Hussein can’t be deterred when he has everything to lose -- his regime, army, all those palaces and portraits -- why would he hesitate to roll the dice when he knows he’s finished? That’s when his immunity to deterrence becomes a real problem.

The idea of a martyr’s death that consumes as many American soldiers as possible may appeal to the grandiosity of this semiliterate thug who craves fame like that of Saladin, the Kurdish fighter born in his hometown of Tikrit who defeated the Crusaders in the 12th century.

Imagine a scenario that is plausible, even likely: American forces sweep into Iraq after withering attacks from the air and sea have eviscerated Hussein’s armor, aircraft, air defense systems and command and control centers. The American commanders seal off Baghdad and Tikrit, and U.S. troops are on the hunt for Hussein. The Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south see the regime tottering. Bigwigs in Iraq’s ruling Baath Party, intelligence services and military are cutting deals with the Americans to save their skins. Hussein knows he’s finished. But the cagey guy has managed to squirrel away a cache of weapons of mass destruction. How likely is it that he will flinch for fear that the U.S. would retaliate and inflict great suffering on ordinary Iraqis in the process? If Hussein can’t be deterred from using these weapons when he has much to lose, why would he hesitate when he has nothing to lose?

On the basis of what the administration itself has told us about Hussein’s mentality, the answer is pretty clear.

A first strike wouldn’t solve this problem because of the chaos of war and the ample opportunities for concealing weapons of mass destruction in a place as big as Iraq.

Does the policy of “regime change� mean that we may be sending our troops into a chemical, biological or nuclear battlefield? How many Iraqi civilians would perish if Hussein used such weapons? Would Arabs blame Hussein for those deaths or the U.S., on the grounds that it began the war? Would Americans strongly support war against Iraq if Hussein’s doomsday scenario were more widely discussed? It’s not enough to simply pose such questions. Critics of regime change must also explain what they would do should Hussein’s possession of these weapons be confirmed.

There is a way to do that without falling back on the unrealistic and irresponsible no-war-at-any-cost mantra.

The U.S. should declare that it will immediately destroy all facilities that make, store and target such weapons once it learns, at any point, that Iraq is manufacturing them. It should pledge that an attack by Hussein on his neighbors, with conventional or nuclear weapons, will be equivalent to a war on the U.S.

While weapons inspections are continuing, the U.S. should seek Security Council approval for this policy as a condition for abandoning regime change. This approach would clear Iraq of weapons of mass destruction -- without our troops, citizens and friends risking an encounter with Hussein’s deadly toys.