NATO Has Power, Milosevic Calls Shots

The paradox of the Kosovo war is that the U.S. and its NATO allies have vastly superior air power, but the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Milosevic has all the choices. It can resist regardless of the damage inflicted by the bombing, or it can stop the war by allowing NATO forces to enter Kosovo.

The immediate issue for both sides is who controls on the ground. For NATO, it is the only way of protecting the Albanian population, whose televised sufferings have been the entire reason for its involvement. For Milosevic, the arrival of NATO troops means the inevitable end of Serbian rule over Kosovo.

Milosevic must therefore choose between two bad alternatives, but at least he does have a choice between continuing to fight and succumbing. By contrast, the U.S. and its allies have no choice but to continue the bombing until Milosevic capitulates, on pain of suffering a debacle that would destroy the credibility of the North Atlantic alliance. The disproportion between that colossal risk and the provincial scale of the Kosovo crisis is one reason why veteran internationalists like Henry Kissinger oppose the war.

It was not only the failure of negotiation that persuaded the Clinton administration to start the bombing but also the hope that it would not have to persist at it for very long. A theory that is beginning to seem dangerously optimistic holds that Milosevic wanted the bombardment of Yugoslavia as a way of ending the crisis without losing personal power. In spite of an authoritarian climate, there is still a parliament in Serbia that dominates what is left of Yugoslavia, and the ultranationalist opposition certainly would have gathered enough votes to form a government if Milosevic had given up Kosovo without a fight. He would then have only remained the president of the federation--a weak office in itself. According to this optimistic scenario, Milosevic is waiting for the bombing to inflict enough damage to silence his opposition before accepting Kosovo’s autonomy.

In the pessimistic view, which seems more probable each day, Milosevic is not a Serbian Clinton or Blair, always looking for the best move regardless of principles or prejudices, but rather a stubborn rationalist determined to keep Kosovo at all cost. It matters not if he is sincere or merely playing a role. Either way, the bombing must continue indefinitely, unless a diplomatic exit is found, because no preparations have been made to follow it up with a ground invasion. That may not present much of a combat risk if Serbian air defenses remain as ineffective as they have been, but the political risks are great, both for relations with Russia and for the cohesion of NATO. As it is, Greece is beginning to dissent from continued military action, while the Italian parliament has passed a resolution asking for an early cease-fire. Unlike Greece, moreover, whose contribution to NATO operations is symbolic, Italy can virtually stop the war by denying use of its air bases.

As for relations with Russia, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s last-minute cancellation of a long-planned trip to Washington, and the Russian attempt to secure a U.N. cease-fire resolution, mark the first real interruption in Washington-Moscow diplomatic cooperation since the end of the Soviet Union. Already irritated by NATO’s admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Russians were outraged by the attack on Serbia, Russia’s little brother in the Balkans. That’s why Washington immediately welcomed Primakov’s visit to Belgrade, hoping for an acceptable solution, but, in any case, content to see the Russians back in the loop--assuming that he went to tame Milosevic and not to encourage him.

Persistent bombing of Serbia will almost certainly result in Russian retaliation, perhaps the airlift of advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Serbia, perhaps non-ratification of the Start II nuclear weapons limitation treaty. Effectively dominated by neo-communists, the Russian Duma would in any case favor a semi-Cold War relationship with the West, selling Russian arms to Iran, etc. Until now, however, the neo-communists have been neutralized by President Boris Yeltsin and, lately, Primakov. That has come to an end, with both embracing a hard-line stance.

If the air campaign fails to end Serbian resistance, the remaining option for NATO would be forcible entry into Kosovo--an outright invasion if there is Serbian resistance. Aside from the political obstacles, formidable logistic obstacles would stand in the way of ground combat. Because of very limited port facilities in Albania and the sad inadequacy of its roads, NATO forces made ready to garrison Kosovo under the peace plan were to be supplied through the Greek port of Thessaloniki and the highways of Macedonia. But those arrangements presumed that NATO would enter Kosovo with Serbian consent. Neither the Greeks nor the Macedonians are likely to allow use of their territory to wage a ground war. That would force the allies to operate through Albania, an enormously difficult task. If the Milosevic government decides to mount an all-out resistance against a NATO invasion, fighting probably would extend to Bosnia, which would at least provide staging areas in Slovenia and Croatia.

What is wrong with all the above is not only that the bad scenarios are very bad, but also that the U.S. and NATO have conceded the initiative to Milosevic. Only he has the power to end this war; so far there is no sign that he means to do so.