Why Was There Virtually No Looting After the Earthquake?

In the weeks since Los Angeles re-earned its country-music name, “Shakytown,� one statistic has pleasantly surprised many, including the police. Looting has been virtually ab sent in the wake of the Northridge earthquake. Official Los Angeles Police Department stats for such arrests remain fewer than 10.

How can this be? Don’t all the scenarios for the Big One include scenes of shaken citizens defending themselves against bands of looters when the police are unable to respond?

One obvious reason for the overwhelmingly lawful citizen reaction to the quake was the rapid and aggressive governmental response. In addition to those directly dealing with the physical trauma and property damage, large contingents of police, sheriff’s deputies, highway patrol and National Guard were quickly deployed and kept on duty until reasonable control was established. One captain in the San Fernando Valley, for example, reports that his nine radio-car patrol force was supplemented by 25 two-per- son units drawn from the LAPD, 60 deputy sheriffs assigned to an anti-looting task force and a large number of Guardsmen on duty at emergency shelters. Officers who live in the most severely affected quake areas report an almost constant presence of on-duty law en- forcement in their neighborhoods.

One high-ranking police official believes that early public statements by Mayor Richard Riordan and Chief of Police Willie L. Williams, plus the imposition of a curfew, also sent a clear message that looting would not be tolerated. The relatively smooth functioning of the city’s emergency-management structure helped to create a feeling that government was in control and had the capability to stop lawbreakers.

Other factors narrowed the opportunity to loot. Business owners and operators were at their stores soon after the initial tremor, cleaning up broken glass, restacking shelves or boarding up windows. By nightfall, their businesses were generally secured. Second, most residents displaced by the quake stayed within sight of their homes or apartments. Even those who moved to shelters spent considerable time at their damaged residences.

Plausible as these explanations are, something deeper seemed to have spawned a public morality that so broadly rejected capitalizing on the misfortune of others. When the extent of the horror became known, some officers reported, residents tended to turn inward to deal with personal survival issues. One young captain quipped: “The bad guys were as ‘rattled’ as the good people.� All agreed, however, that a more powerful motivation than mere self-interest was at work.

For Angelenos, the quake was a shared experience, an experience largely unaffected by economic status, age, race or ethnicity, gender, occupation, or the myriad other classifications that serve to separate us. Fear, apprehension, uncertainty about the future, concern for loved ones, profound personal and material loss--all were unifying forces. As one Valley captain put it, “Not all of the walls that came down on Jan. 17 were made of wood or masonry.� Shared adversity, at least temporarily, become a persuasive advocate for the value of mutual respect.

Cops, as is the case with most other Los Angelenos, have lately become adept at searching for silver linings. Every officer I talked with described some positive omen he or she discovered while coping with the earthquake’s aftermath. Some hoped the LAPD would adopt some of the alternative work schedules--longer hours, fewer days--that have appeared effective since the quake.

One explanation of the low post-quake crime rate has immediate implications for the future of policing. The northwest San Fernando Valley has a reputation for effective police-community involvement. It is where Neighborhood Watch began in Los Angeles, probably because it was where the program founder, then Chief of Police Ed Davis, lived. The program’s structure, according to one captain, served as a natural vehicle for the initial quake-recovery efforts. Block captains reportedly provided organization, leadership and information to their neighbors in the hours after the quake. In one instance, citizens stood guard over a police-community sponsored computer training facility for teens that had lost its windows until police could respond.

Clearly, there are lessons to be learned from the virtual absence of quake-inspired looting. City officials who can provide leadership for earthquake recovery can do the same in other areas of responsibility.

Public and private agencies that have combined forces to overcome the quake’s effects can address other interjurisdictional problems. And a citizenry that recognizes the common threat of a chilling earthquake can extend that recognition to the equally serious threats posed by violent crime and other social illnesses.*