PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIDDLE EAST : The Arabs Block the Road to Peace : Unreliability, confusion and recalcitrance add up to a massive obstruction, more formidable than the Israeli settlements.

Many prominent Americans believe that the refusal of Israel’s Likud government to accept the land-for-peace formula is the most important obstacle to progress in the Middle East peace process. Notable among such Americans are former presidents, some of whom hold otherwise favorable views of Israel, and former national security advisers and secretaries of state who have always held mixed views of Israel, and leaders of the American Jewish community who are influential in molding public opinion.

This situation is compounded by Likud spokesmen who use unconvincing arguments in rebuttal, like the assertion that Israel has already given all the territory that it needs to give, or that the Arabs also need to give up land in exchange for peace. No one is addressing the central problem, which is this:

Although many Arab states, and many Palestinian individuals, do indeed aspire to peace on reasonable terms, critical stumbling blocks remain on the Arab side of the problem.

First, Syria does not show a willingness to abandon the long-term struggle against Israel’s existence. For a fleeting moment, sometime last year, it did appear that the Syrian leadership had finally crossed the Rubicon, and was willing, if reluctant, to enter into a diplomatic process leading to a permanent resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Developments since then have cast shadows of doubt over this hope.

Syria is not at the moment necessarily inclined to full-blown war against Israel, but the ideological metamorphosis that the Syrian Baath needed to undergo on the road to abandoning the armed struggle has probably not yet occurred. Moreover, there is no clear line of succession in Damascus to assure Israel that a future Syrian leadership would adhere for a reasonable time to the spirit of a land-for-peace deal. Syria does not seem ready for the kind of full de jure peace that exists between Israel and Egypt, which justified the generous land-for-peace deal from an Israeli point of view. Nor, for that matter, does the Syrian leadership appear willing to foster even the kind of de facto peace that has existed between Israel and Jordan for the past two decades, in which both sides implicitly renounced aggressive intentions toward each other and cooperated fruitfully in various administrative and economic fields.

Second, the complexity of Palestinian internal politics is bedeviling the negotiating process in an unfortunate manner. While it may be true that the way in which the Likud’s settlements policy is carried out is foolhardy and aggravating, it is also true that the core of Israeli-Palestinian incompatibilities will not be removed even if the Likud government loses in the June election.

The real reason that no progress has been made on Palestinian autonomy is that Palestinian politics remain fundamentally unchanged. The people who are willing to negotiate, and who do grasp the wisdom of compromise, can’t deliver the goods; the ones who can deliver the goods don’t grasp the wisdom of compromise.

The tragedy of the Palestinians has always been the demise of reason, and in spite of appearances in the gilded halls of Madrid or Washington, not much has changed in the casbahs of Nablus and Hebron or in the village mosques. All this may, unfortunately, eventually become apparent, thus marginalizing the blame--right and wrong--so far laid at the doorstep of the Likud governments.

The Palestinians who do favor progress in establishing autonomy erred in latching on to Syria’s demand for an international conference with its Soviet patron as co-sponsor, as well as in believing that American patronage would be to their benefit. They probably would have achieved better results settling questions of autonomy with Israeli officials over a plate of humus and olives in a cafe in Jericho. The United States could still have quietly witnessed any agreement as a third-party guarantor, which is what both sides would have wanted anyway.

The third stumbling block lies with the rejectionist Arab states. Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, and possibly the House of Saud (albeit with major trepidation) have all indicated some genuine willingness to accept Israel’s integration into the region. This is a momentous favorable change. However, prospects are dim for Libya, Iraq or Algeria to join the peace process. When combined with the dubious Syrian commitment and concerns about the stability of Arab regimes, the overall outlook is problematic.

Israel needs to take some risks for peace, including giving more land for peace, but Israel probably should not give up land in exchange for attitudes that are suspect from the outset. Interim arrangements, especially on the Golan Heights, could conceivably tide the parties over until clear commitments can be attained, but neither side is showing any interest in such initiatives.

The Likud government’s loud rejection of land for peace is unhelpful and its settlements policy may be misguided, especially if it erodes Israel’s crucial support by the American Jewish community. But these are not the only issues holding up the peace process; the others could turn out to be much more threatening to it.