Show Eastern Europeans Which Side We Are On

American policy toward Eastern Europe seems either so befuddled by the pace of events that it cannot react or so pessimistic about prospects that it feels little need to do anything. Confusion is understandable and pessimism is warranted, but neither is the right guide to policy.

Certainly, the pace of events is dizzying. Yesterday’s impossibility becomes today’s conventional wisdom and tomorrow’s old hat. Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev himself has pushed the pace: By publicizing his telephone call to Polish Communists to tell them the time had come for a non-communist government, he toppled dominoes that will fall at least in Hungary; opposition leaders there who had been prepared to settle for half a loaf now say, “Why settle for less than Solidarity?”

The most credible argument for American inaction is that with so much uncertainty, anything the United States did would be as likely to boomerang as to help. In particular, any action might cross the line for Moscow and look like meddling. Thus, the argument runs, better to do nothing than to risk giving Moscow or its local allies the pretext for a crackdown.

The concern is fair, but we do not seem close to the line. Gorbachev may be confused but does not appear worried. His government seems almost to welcome Western economic assistance to Eastern Europe; it hardly has much choice. So, too, it cannot object to technical assistance to develop managers or economic policy-makers. Helping train journalists or opposition party organizers probably skates closer to whatever line there is, but however attractive America remains in Eastern Europe, journalists and parties have their own good reasons to avoid the “made in the USA” label.

It is reasonable to believe that, however confused Moscow may be, defections from the Warsaw Pact would still ring alarm bells. Plainly, the United States should make sure that it cannot be accused of angling for those defections. When the question of military alliances arises--and it will, pushed, for instance, by the younger hotheads in Solidarity whom Lech Walesa strives to control--Washington can say that it is a matter for the Warsaw Pact itself. What we care about are the political openings and economic restructuring; we are negotiating elsewhere to draw down the military confrontation in Europe.

The other explanation for Washington’s inaction is pessimism: Gorbachev’s experiment is destined to be still-born and Eastern Europe’s economic plight is all but hopeless. Both may be true. But for Washington to make policy as though it is only waiting for Gorbachev’s successors is more than a little strange--to America’s allies and to its citizens, not to mention the Eastern Europeans themselves.

More immediately, doing more for Poland meets with the analogy to the mid-1970s. Then, Washington encouraged lending to what looked like a reformist Communist government, only to have the lenders find that the reforms were elusive and the money only disappeared down a rat hole of consumerism.

The analogy is mistaken, however, and having made a mistake then does not justify making another now. This Polish government is led by non-communists, not Communists, even if Communist apparatchiks still weigh it down. This government’s reforms may not succeed, but the attempt will be serious.

And while much of what has happened in Eastern Europe is reversible, this much is not: If the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government in Poland fails, it will not--short of the arrival of Soviet tanks--be replaced by Poland’s old Communist masters. If it is thrown out, another non-communist government will follow. Poland’s Communists are--again save for the arrival of tanks--gone forever.

Hence, helping Poland is now more political than economic. It is help to the process of non-communist governance, not a bet on a particular government. Whether CIA analysts conclude this government’s anti-inflation plan workable is relevant but not decisive. Poland has become the first non-communist government in Eastern Europe since World War II, and the United States has offered it $119 million in assistance, plus another $50 million in food aid. Surely, democracy in Poland is worth more than one-fourth of a B-2 bomber.

American aid is not in any case going to make Poland’s economic future. But the political case for doing more is compelling. It should not be beyond our wits--or even our budgets--to come up with a billion-dollar package and so to push our European allies, who are coordinating aid to Poland through the Common Market, to do likewise.

Forty years of American hopes for Eastern Europe are coming true. It is time to bet our hopes, not our fears, and to demonstrate to those who have succeeded in Eastern Europe that we are on their side.