Polish Reforms Facing Trouble Left and Right

WASHINGTON —  An unholy alliance between Solidarity and hard-line communists--unwitting on Solidarity’s part--could undermine the Polish government on Nov. 29, plunging the country into political chaos, putting Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski’s leadership in jeopardy--and leaving the old guard in triumph.

The turning point will be a national referendum called by Jaruzelski to seek approval for a prolonged period of “radical” change aimed at a basic improvement in the nation’s economy and well-being, and at creating a “Polish model of thorough democratization of political life” for “strengthening self-management, extending human rights and increasing the participation of citizens.” Specific plans include merging industrial ministries into one agency, slicing 25% of the government bureaucracy, permitting a larger number of private enterprises and encouraging more foreign trade.

But the Polish reform, formally launched last month as the model for economic and political change in Eastern Europe, is being fought and sabotaged by the democratic opposition as well as by entrenched hard-liners hankering for the grim joys of the Stalinist Days. For allies, Jaruzelski must look outside, to his Soviet friend, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Washington.

Wildly contrasting responses to the proposed Polish model suggest how deeply and rapidly political patterns have shifted during the decade of the ‘80s--and the extent of confusion currently prevailing in all camps. Gorbachev experiences similar pressures and attacks in Moscow, even though he has not yet gone as far as the Poles in actual reform programs. The Polish Parliament sanctioned the referendum last month, setting the stage for the first such national expression in 41 years. The Soviet leadership has not yet reached the point of organizing a referendum--and it may never do so.

Poland’s survival as a viable, modern society depends on a new model. After four decades of communist rule, the current model proved a catastrophe for this nation of 37 million people, although even Polish communist leaders have always striven for a “Polish way to socialism.” Today, the real search is for a Polish way away from socialism, although such language is still not for public use.

The surge of the Solidarity free trade-union movement in 1980 was what opened the way to the current push for reform. Jaruzelski’s army and police smashed Solidarity--as an organization--with the establishment of martial law late in 1981. Yet these days the general is the first to admit that legitimate worker protests, the impulsion for Solidarity, were the forerunners of today’s Polish model. Jaruzelski, in fact, began planning his reforms as early as 1983--two years before Gorbachev came to power in the Kremlin.

Even as this new chapter in the Polish drama opens, new perils loom ahead. Jaruzelski’s proposals have been savagely attacked and sabotaged by the communist old guard from the very outset, mainly because the bureaucrats’ power and privileges were threatened. The opposition within the party was critical of the relative political pluralism Jaruzelski tolerated after martial law was lifted in 1983 and, before Gorbachev, the old guard enjoyed support from Moscow. Now the Polish anti-reform faction has lost official Soviet backing, but hard-liners have found allies among workers and functionaries who depend upon a paycheck for security but who have little interest in improving production.

Jaruzelski has hidden enemies at high Communist Party leadership levels and theirs is a no-holds-barred struggle. A disinformation campaign tries to portray the general as weak, indecisive and hostile to democratization processes. The idea is to reinforce anti-Jaruzelski sentiment among liberal dissidents in the larger society and among the former Solidarity militants, hoping to isolate the general and his government from all sides.

A secret battle has raged in the Central Committee and its Politburo over reform and referendum since late September; the results appear mixed. At an October plenary meeting of the Central Committee, after several 17-hour Politburo sessions, Jaruzelski won approval for the referendum. He warned the nation, publicly, that the changes would be painful and difficult for the next three years--but inevitable for restoring national stability.

The general failed, however, at the October meeting to push through his most revolutionary political vision for the Polish model--to replace the 1952 communist-inspired Polish constitution with a new pro-democratic constitution that, among other things, would change the nation’s name from the Polish People’s Republic back to the Polish Republic.

The current Jaruzelski plan is to have the next Parliament, to be elected in 1989 under a liberalized voting system, draft a constitution for unveiling on May 3, 1991--the 200th anniversary of Poland’s first democratic constitution. The May 3 date, once Poland’s national day, had been consigned to oblivion by the communists but the general is a nationalist. And before the referendum, Jaruzelski is likely to try once more to have the constitutional proposal approved by the Central Committee.

The democratic opposition has come out against the referendum in what may be a well-meaning miscalculation of historical proportions. In late October, Lech Walesa, the head of the recently reorganized Solidarity underground, urged a boycott of the referendum because “society should not take part in an undertaking of a purely propaganda nature.” Under a new law a referendum proposition may carry only if it receives over 50% of “yes” ballots from eligible voters; a Solidarity boycott and an old-guard “no” could defeat the effort.

Then economic reform would be paralyzed and Polish prospects would once again look hopeless. Although the first stages of economic reform proved disappointing, a World Bank report on Poland issued in late summer commented that the new Polish scenario offers grounds for optimism and gives promise of “faster growth, greater competitiveness . . . faster technological progress, a more rapid improvement in living standards and a smaller external debt.”

The success of reform is tied to assistance from the World Bank and the IMF; both are rooting for Poland, but a referendum defeat would bury these hopes, too. Then why are Poland’s democrats joining the old bureaucrats against it?

Fundamentally, it is a problem of national trust in the Jaruzelski regime; martial law and Solidarity’s destruction have not been forgotten. With some historic justification, most Poles distrust everybody, including their leaders, and Jaruzelski has not made a personal impact on his cynical nation. Curiously, Walesa himself is not entirely opposed to forms of cooperation with Jaruzelski, believing that reforms are inevitable (please see his story on Page 1).

The general, however, played his cards wrong this fall by refusing to consult, even privately, with Walesa and his associates on the proposals, although Jaruzelski knows that opposition support for the reforms is vital in the referendum. Walesa remained silent for a time after the referendum was first officially proposed but finally yielded to pressure from the most outspoken opposition leaders and agreed to adopt the boycott stance. Happier days will come to Poland only when Poles learn to speak to each other with a modicum of wisdom and tolerance; in the meantime, crisis appears to tumble upon crisis.