Con Game on Missiles? : Maybe We’re Close to an Agreement on Europe, or Maybe--

The Reagan Administration has long been extremely cynical in the way it plays public relations. Its domestic programs are never going to hurt the poor. The Nicaraguan contras are always going to make a breakthrough in six months. And arms were not offered to Iran for hostages because we never deal with terrorists. “Con game” is not too harsh a term to describe such actions.

In arms control, too, agreement has always been around the corner. But the question remains: Are we really close to an agreement on missiles in Europe, or are we seeing another con game?

This time the statements emanating from Secretary of State George P. Shultz and White House Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker Jr. are extraordinarily self-confident. This time North Atlantic Treaty Organization diplomats are talking about an agreement in two months. And this time the Administration has a vital interest in an agreement that gives the impression of momentum in foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the obstacles to a zero-option agreement seem strong. There is the possibility that the con is on once more.

First, an extraordinary array of people --among them Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, Foreign Affairs editor William Hyland and Gen. Brent Scowcroft--say that a total withdrawal of American medium-range missiles from Europe is not in America’s interest. The arguments that have persuaded these men are weighty, and may create unsolvable problems in the negotiations or in the ratification process.

Second, a limitation on intermediate missiles makes no sense without limits on long-range missiles. Otherwise either side can increase its long-range missiles to compensate.

The Reagan Administration has deliberately repudiated the SALT II treaty that limits these long-range missiles. So liberals in Congress will surely make an acceptance of SALT II a condition for the ratification of a medium-range treaty.

Is the Administration ready to accept this? Or will it tell the liberals, “Don’t worry. The Soviets say that they won’t increase their long-range missiles, and we can trust them.” Really?

Third, the issue of moving 100 of the intermediate-range warheads back to the United States and another 100 of them to Soviet Asia is knotty in the extreme. American sources have said that this would not be verifiable, and the United States attempted to solve the issue by excluding these warheads in the Moscow talks. The Soviets apparently refused.

The verification question is in fact hopeless. The press has not absorbed the fact that cruise missiles--be they ground-, sea- or air-launched--are essentially identical intermediate-range weapons. The 100-warhead limit makes sense only if all cruise missiles are included; otherwise ground-launched cruise missiles will be produced in the guise of sea and air weapons. Even then these missiles are so easy to hide that it is hard to believe that either Washington or Moscow would accept the necessary verification.

Indeed, even if we restrict the agreement to Europe, this must presumably include Soviet cruise missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. If the verification were to be meaningful, it would be so intrusive that the Soviets would not accept it.

Fourth, the Soviets’ behavior often gives a clue to progress in behind-the-scenes negotiations. This now suggests little progress. They sent a low-ranking deputy minister to meet Shultz at the Moscow airport, and communiques by Tass included statements treating Shultz with contempt. Maybe the Soviets think that they can taunt the Americans into a bad deal, but they act as if they have the Americans on the run in the propaganda war in Europe and are pressing their victory home.

But if there is a con game going on, who is in the know? Certainly the Pentagon. It keeps advancing one unacceptable proposal after another, and Richard N. Perle has been demonstrating the calmness of a man who knows where the joker is now.

What Mikhail S. Gorbachev has learned, unfortunately, is that all that he has to do is accept these proposals and Washington and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies must retreat in disarray because they can’t live with them, either.

My guess is that the secretary of state is being optimistic without understanding the issues. Shultz negotiated a Lebanon-Israeli agreement without realizing that Syria was crucial, and he let his President go unprepared to a summit at Reykjavik without realizing that a trap had been set. History may be repeating itself.

The really interesting question is Howard Baker’s knowledge. He comes with a reputation for real competence, and has a time perspective that goes beyond 1988. The strongest evidence that an agreement is really probable is that Baker says so.

But if there is a con game and Baker is being conned rather than being one of the con men, if Gorbachev is about to score another unexpected propaganda victory over the President, then we may see a real personnel housecleaning in the foreign-policy sphere. Then the stage will be set for an arms-control agreement that is really in American interests--one that would link a partial withdrawal of American missiles from Europe with a substantial reduction of conventional forces.