France Joins America in Errors on Libya

PARIS —  The military course of action that America chose against Libya proved inadequate. One does not destabilize regimes by a limited use of bombers alone.

The first consequence of the American strategy has been to expose the divisions among the Western allies. It has also forced the Europeans to reach a compromise among themselves and to take modest but unified and sterner measures against Libya, measures that would have been more than welcome months ago. Europe’s passivity, its refusal to engage in economic sanctions against Moammar Kadafi, probably encouraged the Americans in a military intervention that was either too much or too little.

One of the most immediate consequences of the American raid has been to create a rift between the Americans and the French over France’s refusal to allow the use of its air space by the American bombers. Spain did the same but was not singled out. The revelation this week that France would have joined a comprehensive assault to remove Kadafi is not entirely convincing and will not defuse American criticism.

Official U.S. government criticism of France’s decision, initially discreet, mounted to the point of excess as President Reagan chose to play on the emotions expressed by Americans in opinion polls. While understandable from an American point of view, U.S. disillusionment with France has been misdirected and politically misused.

The Reagan Administration should not have been surprised by France’s decision not to open its air space; it was in tune with the French tradition of independence--or selfishness, as it was denounced by some here, including former President Valery Giscard d’Estaing. This tradition was reinforced in the present circumstances by immediate considerations involving the situation in the Middle East. French concern over the fate of the hostages in Beirut unfortunately proved to be only too correct: British hostages have paid for British policy with their lives. France is also keen on adopting a low-profile policy in the region at large. Any attempt to reopen doors with Iran would have been jeopardized by overt support for an action whose means, if not ultimate goals, were open to dispute.

The French position has reopened historic wounds and betrayed expectations that had been inflated by France’s recent exemplary behavior (in American eyes).

In one blow France consolidated American frustrations over its past behavior in the Atlantic alliance: its emphasizing independence over solidarity; its Middle East policy, judged too tilted toward the Arab world, and its policy toward terrorism, deemed too soft.

Disenchantment with the country of Lafayette was reinforced by the expectations that the Reagan Administration had nourished vis-a-vis France’s new conservative majority. Had France’s Gaullists really changed? Under the spell of Premier Jacques Chirac, who some time ago used to present himself as a Reaganite, the Administration assumed that France would be more cooperative on terrorism and more supportive of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Neither development has materialized to any significant degree.

The French are sympathetic to the goal of eliminating terrorism, having experienced many incidents on their own soil. And they have a special grudge against Kadafi: The territory of his ambitions, a wide area from North Africa to the Middle East, includes former colonies that France remains tied to by feelings of fraternity and responsibility. Ideally the French would have liked the Americans to do the job in Libya by themselves in a clean and efficient way, and without French participation. But one can’t have one’s cake and eat it, too.

American criticisms of France are all the more excessive in light of the fact that French public opinion on the U.S. action has been the most receptive in Europe: 66% of the French were favorable to the U.S. decision to use force; 55% were, according to another poll, supportive of their government’s decision not to be part of the air strike. The contrast with British sentiment is significant: Anti-Americanism in Great Britain is rising as Margaret Thatcher’s popularity declines steadily.

Lately, in French eyes, the Soviet Union has replaced the United States as the arch-villain of the international system. This new attitude will not be enhanced by American overreaction.

When the present transatlantic emotions settle down (no one has an interest in letting them be exploited, either by Kadafi or by the Soviet Union), two things will remain to be said. By applying military strength against Kadafi, the Americans were probably right, even if the means chosen--excessive reliance on technology, unique to American culture--proved to be inadequate. But condemning U.S. action by denigrating its immediate goal or means could be justified only if the Europeans had taken a responsible course of action. The argument that refuses the identification between Kadafi and terrorism misses an essential point. Terrorism is not restricted to Libya, but Libya is much more than terrorism. It is a country that has identified itself with attempts at destabilization from Africa to the Middle East. For this, Kadafi must be curbed.